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I. INTRODUCTION

It is uncontroversial that litigation is too expensive. Controversy
abounds, however, over who is to blame and what is to be done about
the problem. Plaintiffs and defendants each accuse the other of
pursuing weak or meritless litigation positions that inflict needless
expense. This Article suggests that regardless of who is correct-and
who is more often at fault-the same set of solutions may be available
to assuage the problem. The Article embraces a combination of
procedural reforms and market mechanisms designed to improve
matters for both sides and to make it less likely that a party with a
meritorious litigation position will fall victim to an adversary's sharp
tactics. Specifically, I embrace an English-style approach, one which
combines a loser-pays, fee-shifting regime with a market-based, riskallocation mechanism designed to counterbalance the evils of fee
shifting and to protect risk-averse litigants against losing a meritorious
case and being forced to bear their opponents' legal fees as well as their
own.

*
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. My thanks to John Didday for
research assistance and to participants of the Institute for Law & Economic Policy 19th Annual
Symposium on "The Economics of Aggregate Litigation," held on April 11-12, 2013, in Naples,
Florida.
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Although I suggest a single set of reforms to address the
problems identified by plaintiffs and defendants alike, it is important
to acknowledge at the outset that different constituencies view the
problem from very different perspectives and tend to favor very
different solutions. First, consider the perspective of corporate
defendants. Corporate America is perhaps the most vocal critic of
litigation expense-understandably so, given that large, deep-pocketed
businesses so often are targeted as defendants and bear a
disproportionate share of litigation's burdens. Corporate defendants
blame plaintiffs for litigation's inordinate expense, observing that it is
plaintiffs who choose to initiate litigation, imposing significant burdens
on American businesses. Corporate America's prescription is to make it
more difficult for plaintiffs to pursue those suits. Defendants seek to
erect additional hurdles to the filing of new lawsuits-embracing
heightened pleading standards, greater use of motions to dismiss and
summary judgment, and fee shifting for weak or meritless cases.
Corporate defendants' goal is, at bottom, to reduce the number of
lawsuits they face and to make litigation more difficult for plaintiffs to
initiate.
But plaintiffs-and not just individuals, but also small
companies in business disputes-place the blame elsewhere. If
litigation is too expensive, they argue, it is because corporate
defendants purposely make it expensive in order to render litigation
prohibitively burdensome for cash-strapped plaintiffs. Imbalances in
litigant resources can dramatically affect the litigation process,
enabling the stronger party to obtain a better outcome than the merits
warrant and depriving the weaker party of a fair and just result.
Defendants can exploit these imbalances to force plaintiffs to settle for
too little or to give up a case. Given that defendants already impose
significant burdens on plaintiffs-by doing everything they can to
escalate expense and delay justice-any effort to erect new, additional
hurdles against the filing of lawsuits would only aggravate the problem
from plaintiffs' perspective. Plaintiffs thus embrace reforms that would
level the playing field, streamline their path to recovery, and make it
easier, not harder, to pursue their claims. Plaintiffs support fee shifting,
provided it is one-way fee shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs, as is
found in civil rights and antitrust actions.
Finally, courts blame plaintiffs and defendants alike for
excessive litigation. It may sometimes be the plaintiffs' fault for filing
suits or the defendants' fault for escalating them, but either way, courts
bear part of the burden. From a court's perspective, plaintiffs should
file fewer suits, defendants should defend suits less vigorously, and
parties should resolve their disputes peacefully in a manner that

2013]

FEE SHIFTING AND FREE MARKET

1809

conserves judicial resources. Although defendants would like courts to
punish plaintiffs for pursuing weak claims, and plaintiffs would like
courts to punish defendants for resisting strong claims, courts lack the
resources to do either effectively.
It may appear at first glance that the perspectives of plaintiffs,
defendants, and courts are irreconcilable, but they in fact share an
important common ground. True, defendants want to erect additional
hurdles to litigation while plaintiffs want to eliminate some of the
hurdles they already face, but both recognize a key distinction between
meritorious and meritless suits. Defendants might, as an absolute
matter, prefer fewer lawsuits overall. But, a reform that at least frees
them from the burdens of defending meritless suits would likely be
sufficient. And plaintiffs might, as an absolute matter, prefer to clear
away any obstacle that stands between them and a large recovery. But
a compromise that facilitates their pursuit of meritorious cases, even if
it discourages meritless ones, would likely satisfy them too. Courts,
likewise, are of course happy to embrace reforms that distinguish
meritorious from meritless suits. Indeed, it is the courts' core mission
to ensure that meritorious claims prevail and meritless ones fail. It is
only because courts lack resources that they are unable to ensure that
this happens in every case. A set of reforms that screens cases at the
outset-so as to advance meritorious claims and deter meritless oneswould go a long way toward minimizing the burdens about which
plaintiffs, defendants, and courts complain.
The real question for reformers, then, is not whether we should
erect new obstacles to litigation or clear away existing ones, but
whether we can effectively distinguish meritorious from meritless
claims and can encourage or discourage litigation accordingly. The
problem, of course, is that we use our unduly expensive litigation
process to distinguish good cases from bad. Our system does not do this
early enough to conserve litigation resources. If a case survives a motion
to dismiss and proceeds to discovery, it will receive largely the same
treatment under our system regardless of how strong or weak it is on
the merits. The parties will engage in expensive, burdensome discovery
and, in most cases, will settle based only in part on their perceptions of
the merits. The resulting settlement will also reflect the parties'
relative abilities to bear the risk and expense of continued litigation and
their need for certainty and finality. Judges may intervene to promote
a settlement, sometimes offering their views on the merits in the
process. But to the extent that judges actively promote settlement, they
typically advocate compromise, encouraging defendants to pay more
and plaintiffs to accept less than they think the merits would warrant.
Courts might take responsibility for promoting accurate settlements, as

1810

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:6:1807

opposed to just, promoting any settlement. Indeed, I have elsewhere
advocated for active judicial engagement on motions to dismiss and
summary judgment, which can narrow the scope of claims and defenses
and therefore increase the chances of a merits-based resolution.' But
such additional judicial efforts would only aggravate the problems that
courts face with overcrowded dockets and overburdened judges. By the
time we complete enough of the litigation process to decide whether a
case has merit, we generally have already exhausted most of the
resources that reformers would like us to save.
What we need, then, is a set of reforms that enables us to
promote meritorious lawsuits and to discourage meritless lawsuits at
the outset, or at least before we devote substantial resources to those
disputes. We need a mechanism that from the start can protect
defendants against weak suits and can clear hurdles for plaintiffs to
pursue strong suits. But how can we do so without using up the very
resources we are seeking to conserve and placing additional burdens on
already overburdened courts?
The most obvious potential reform-one that has been embraced
by some scholarS2 and some countries, 3 but which has also been plagued
by seemingly insurmountable problems-is a fee-shifting regime. A feeshifting regime should incentivize plaintiffs with weak cases to stop and
think before they file a suit, or even a bit later when confronted with a
1.
Jonathan T. Molot, An Old JudicialRole for a New LitigationEra, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 11018 (2003); Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil
Procedure,84 VA. L. REV. 955, 1026-50 (1998); Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. ProcedureSkews Tort
Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 61-62, 108-16 (1997).

2.

See, e.g., Brandon Chad Bungard, Fee! Fie! Foe! Fum!: I Smell the Efficiency of the

English Rule Finding the Right Approach to Tort Reform, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 62-64 (2006)
(arguing a change to the English Rule of fee shifting would be efficient); Lorraine Wright

Feuerstein, Two-Way Fee Shifting on Summary Judgment or Dismissal:An Equitable Deterrent to
Unmeritorious Lawsuits, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 125, 156-73 (1995) (proposing a federal statute
requiring two-way fee shifting upon summary judgment, involuntary dismissal, or a granted
motion to dismiss and'concluding that the benefits of two-way fee shifting outweigh its costs);
Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 739-45 (2010) (proposing a oneway fee-shifting rule tailored to a party's resources); Note, Fee Simple: A Proposalto Adopt a TwoWay Fee Shift for Low-Income Litigants, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1241-42 (1988) (proposing a twoway fee-shifting rule tied to parties' Legal Services Corporation eligibility); see also Thomas D.

Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651,
652-53 (examining, generally, rationales supporting a fee-shifting regime).

3.

W. Kent Davis, The InternationalView of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is the United

States the "Odd Man Out" in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 361, 403-04
& n.328, 409-13 (1999) (explaining that the English Rule of two-way fee shifting is used
extensively outside of the United States and specifically discussing its use in England, Germany,

Austria, and Mexico); see also Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes:Are We Quietly Repealing
the American Rule?, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 323 (1984), available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edullcp/vol47/iss1/13/ (cataloging this country's departures from the
American Rule, finding nearly two thousand examples of "attorney fee shifting statutes").
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solid defense. The risk of losing a suit and bearing the defendant's legal
fees offers a significant deterrent against the filing of weak or meritless
lawsuits. For this reason, fee shifting is something that pro-business
organizations like the Chamber of Commerce have been championing
for some time. Conversely, where plaintiffs have meritorious claims, fee
shifting is the only mechanism that can truly compensate them for their
injuries by reimbursing them for the expenses they have incurred in
litigation as well as for the underlying harm they have suffered. Indeed,
only a fee-shifting regime can enable plaintiffs to bring meritorious,
low-value suits, which plaintiffs, routinely must forego in a non-feeshifting regime. And plaintiffs are much more likely to enjoy early, fair
settlements for meritorious suits in a fee-shifting regime, as defendants
facing the prospect of bearing both sides' legal fees have stronger
incentives to settle rather than to impose burdens on their opponents
by dragging out the litigation. Fee shifting also should be appealing to
courts, as it discourages weak suits and encourages settlement of strong
ones, provided that we have an automatic loser-pays regime and that
courts do not have to undertake the additional work to decide whether
to shift fees in favor of the winner.
But for all of its obvious attributes, a fee-shifting regime also has
fundamental problems that have been the subject of a great deal of
scholarship. First and foremost, fee shifting is premised on the
existence of a level playing field in which litigants weigh the risks and
rewards of litigation similarly. But where a plaintiff is risk averse or
resource constrained, it may simply be unable to bear the risk of losing
a case and being stuck with the defendant's legal fees. 4 In a system
characterized by imbalances in resources and risk preferences, fee
shifting may unduly inhibit already risk-averse plaintiffs-and
aggravate, rather than assuage, existing problems. Instead of
incentivizing plaintiffs to file meritorious claims, as it is intended to do,
fee shifting may discourage them from filing for fear of making a
mistake and being saddled with a large liability. Second, fee shifting
may have negative consequences even in cases between well-matched
adversaries. Where a case is close and the merits are unclear, equally
matched adversaries may spend more on litigation in the hope that they

4.

See, e.g., Mark S. Stein, The English Rule with Client-to-Lawyer Risk Shifting: A

SpeculativeAppraisal, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 603, 605 & n.11, 606(1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Rule: Searching for Winners in a Loser Pays
System, 78 A.B.A. J. 54, 55 (1992)) (noting how two-way fee shifting can discourage risk-averse
plaintiffs from bringing suit and quoting an English judge's conclusion that in a two-way feeshifting regime, "for the ordinary citizen unqualified for Legal Aid, a lawsuit is quite out of the
question").
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will prevail and recoup those expenses.5 In a fee-shifting regime,
optimism on each side may actually lead to an escalation in legal fees.
I suggest that the most important problem with fee shifting-its
tendency to aggravate imbalances in resources and risk preferencescan be overcome through some very simple reforms. If we combine fee
shifting with market mechanisms designed to level the playing field
between unequal adversaries, we can reap all of fee shifting's benefits
while avoiding its principal problems. Indeed, I will argue in this Article
that if our goal is to promote socially optimal litigation spending-so
that litigants spend money on strong, meritorious positions but not on
weak, meritless ones-then the most promising path available is to
combine a fee-shifting regime with a market solution that supplies
insurance and financing to litigants with meritorious positions.
Litigation would become free (or close to free) for the winner and more
costly for the loser. Moreover, a litigant with a meritorious case that is
fearful of being the loser could buy insurance (and obtain financing) to
protect against the risk of loss.
My solution will not necessarily eliminate all of fee shifting's
problems. Fee shifting might still lead to additional spending in close
cases where the ultimate winner cannot be predicted. I concede that
this potential additional spending may be a cost of my proposal. I
believe, however, that this potential cost is worth my proposal's benefits
and that there are aspects of my proposal that may well alleviate those
costs. My principal purpose is to promote spending that advances the
merits and to discourage spending that frustrates the merits. If my
proposal incentivizes additional spending by both sides in close casesand not just spending by the winning party in clear cases-that is a cost
I am willing to accept in exchange for strongly discouraging spending
on weak positions. Moreover, some of my market-based reforms are
likely to combat the problem of mistaken optimism by bringing in a
neutral third party to evaluate litigants' claims with a critical eye.
Before proceeding to lay out the problem and describe my
solution, it is worth locating my position in the existing scholarship on
litigation spending-and pointing out how it differs from other
5.

James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the English

and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225, 230-31 (1995) (explaining the
"optimism effect," where litigants optimistically anticipate shifting fees to their adversaries,
causing the litigants to spend more); see also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 431 (2004):

[Flee-shifting means that a party will not necessarily have to pay the bill for legal
services that he orders, making legal services effectively cheaper. If the plaintiff has a
lawyer spend $1,000 more of time and expects to win with a probability of about 70
percent, the odds that he will have to pay for the extra $1,000 of services are only 30
percent, so their effective cost to him is only $300.
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scholarly efforts to tackle the problem of litigation expense. I am by no
means the first scholar to argue that we should promote a socially
optimal level of litigation.6 But most of the relevant scholarship does
not begin from my premise that a merits-based resolution is the socially
optimal outcome. Where a suit is a so-called "negative-expected-value
suit"7-where the costs of litigation outweigh the benefits the prevailing
party can expect to reap (and perhaps even the broader social benefits
of deterrence)-most scholars have urged that it not be pursued.8 I
begin from the very different premise that litigation in pursuit of the
merits, whether by plaintiffs or defendants, is a social good. The costs
of this good are appropriately characterized as costs of the conduct that
forced the litigant to pursue its meritorious position. Where a plaintiffs
claim is meritorious, the costs incurred to pursue that claim are not
separate, distinct costs of litigation, but rather costs of the conduct that
triggered the litigation in the first place. When a person commits a tort
or a commercial party breaches a contract, the true cost of that tort or
contract breach must include not only the physical injury or monetary
loss suffered, but also the costs of litigating the ensuing dispute. An
"efficient" contract breach is not truly efficient if the resulting benefits
do not exceed the full harm to the counterparty, including the
transaction costs associated with that counterparty's pursuit of
expectancy damages.
The only true costs of litigation are those triggered by the
pursuit of a position at odds with the merits. When a plaintiff pursues
a meritless claim, and a defendant is forced to defend against that
claim, both parties' litigation expenses (and the court's wasted
resources) are a cost of litigation-specifically, a cost of the plaintiffs
decision to file suit. Conversely, when a defendant advances a meritless
defense or otherwise resists paying a meritorious claim, both the
defendant's costs and some portion of the plaintiffs costs are costs of
litigation-in this case, costs of the defendant's decision to resist.

6.
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697,
738 (2005) (arguing in favor of permitting occasional buying and selling of legal claims); Steven

Shavell, The Level of Litigation: Private Versus Social Optimality of Suit and of Settlement, 19
INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 99, 99-101 (1999) (analyzing formulas to achieve a socially optimal level of
litigation via taxes and subsidies).

7.

Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerningthe Credibility and Success of Threats

to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1996) (defining the "negative-expected-value suit").
8.
See id. at 2 (stating that a negative-expected-value suit will be brought only if the
plaintiff "expects to extract a positive settlement offer from the defendant"); SHAVELL, supra note
5, at 423 (concluding that certain negative-value suits-suits in which the plaintiff would
definitely not prevail if the facts known to the plaintiff were also known to the defendant-are
socially undesirable).
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The framework I am advancing is one that puts a great deal of
emphasis on whether a position is meritorious. If a plaintiffs claim is
meritorious, then its pursuit is a cost of the defendant's conduct giving
rise to the suit. Conversely, if a plaintiffs claim is meritless, then both
its pursuit and the defendant's defense are attributable to the plaintiffs
decision to sue. Whether a claim or defense is meritorious or meritless,
then, will determine whether that claim or defense is something we
want to promote or deter.
My heavy emphasis on the merits-which I hold out as the key
to accommodating the concerns of plaintiffs, defendants, and courtsmay lead readers to ask both why I deem the merits to be so important
and how I propose to distinguish between "meritorious" and "meritless"
positions. On the first question-the "why"-I suggest that accurately
enforcing the law through litigation achieves our legal system's goals.
Whether the goal is deterrence of wrongdoing, compensation of victims,
or some other objective, we cannot achieve it if the procedural system
does not accurately enforce the substantive law.9 I am most concerned
about the way in which expense can stand in the way of litigation
accuracy, leading defendants to forego their rights and pay too much or
leading plaintiffs to forego their rights and accept too little. If we
achieve the desirable level of accuracy for less money, that is attractive,
and I address that efficiency question as well. But my principal focus is
to ensure that we spend resources on litigation wisely: in pursuit of the
merits. I argue that the accurate application of law to fact, and thus the
resolution of disputes based on their merits, is a social good we should
maximize, even as we seek to reduce transaction costs.
The question of "how" best to encourage spending on meritorious
positions and to deter spending on meritless ones-and how to tell the
difference between the meritorious and meritless-is, of course, a much
more difficult question. As noted at the outset, every actor sees this
differently. Defendants believe that plaintiffs' claims too often are
meritless, inflicting needless expense and burden. Plaintiffs believe
that their claims are meritorious and that it is defendants who inflict
needless expense by advancing meritless defenses and refusing to
capitulate. Courts see plenty of both but lack the resources to do much
about it.
Rather than come up with my own definition of "meritorious"and invent a new way to decide what counts as the accurate application
of law to facts-I accept Oliver Wendell Holmes's framework. Holmes
9.
See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem,
99 GEO. L.J. 65, 106 (2010) (arguing that "thatthe principal goal of civil procedure should be to
enforce substantive law accurately").
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said that the law is nothing more than "[t]he prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact."10 When we look at a lawsuit at the outset, we can
use Holmes's conception of law to decide which claims and defenses to
encourage and which to discourage. If law is a matter of predicting
litigation outcomes, then we should encourage plaintiffs to file suits we
expect will win and to forego suits we expect will lose. Likewise, we
should encourage defendants to defend suits we expect will lose and to
settle suits we expect will win.11
With that background on my project, here is how I will proceed.
In Part II, I lay out the attraction of fee shifting as a mechanism to cure
litigation's ills and discuss the problems that fee shifting entails. I
suggest that while fee shifting holds promise, the cure in some settings
may be worse than the disease. In Part III, I suggest that the principal
problems of fee shifting can be addressed through market mechanisms.
I explore insurance and finance solutions that can enable risk-averse or
cash-strapped litigants to pursue meritorious positions in a fee-shifting
regime. Some of these solutions are already in place in other commonlaw countries, notably the United Kingdom. Finally, in Part IV, I
compare litigation in the United States and in the United Kingdom,
suggesting some needed adjustments to import fee-shifting rules and
market mechanisms across the pond.
II. WHY FEE SHIFTING ALONE CANNOT WORK
Litigants blame one another for imposing needless litigation
expense. Defendants accuse plaintiffs of filing meritless claims, and
plaintiffs accuse defendants of escalating litigation in the hope that
plaintiffs will give up meritorious claims, or at least settle for less than
their entitlement. To the extent that these accusations are correct-and
we can blame litigation expense on litigants who pursue weak or
meritless positions-the logical remedy is a loser-pays system. If we
want to incentivize plaintiffs to forego meritless claims and defendants
to forego meritless defenses, we should punish them when they advance

10. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., Address at the
Dedication of the New Hall at Boston University School of Law: The Path of the Law (Jan. 8, 1897),
in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) ("The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.").
11. I recognize that a potential cost of this approach is its tendency to discourage test-case
litigation designed to change the law rather than to apply existing law. Rule 11 allows litigants to
pursue legal change without penalty. For a discussion of this potential problem, see infra text
accompanying note 27.
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a losing position.12 Conversely, if we want to encourage plaintiffs and

defendants to pursue meritorious positions, we should reward them
when they do. By shifting legal fees in favor of the prevailing party, we
reward winners and punish losers, incentivizing disputants to resolve
their disputes based on the merits and to avoid unnecessary expense.13
In some areas, the American system already uses fee shifting to
incentivize litigant conduct. Concerned about underenforcement of the
law, Congress has passed statutes awarding legal fees to prevailing
plaintiffs, for example, in antitrust and civil rights cases. 14 The
American system also employs two-way fee shifting to discourage
meritless positions in all types of cases with procedural rules like
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 37.15

But American fee shifting is quite limited. The statutory feeshifting regimes that reward winners and punish losers are confined to
particular subject areas and provide fee shifting only in favor of
prevailing plaintiffs. In contrast, procedural rules like Rule 11 apply
broadly to all cases, working in favor of defendants as well as plaintiffs.
They do not, however, seek to punish all losing positions and reward all
winning positions, but rather only to punish positions that are frivolous.
Some scholars have advocated a broader fee-shifting regime
analogous to that found in England. This regime would require the loser
to bear the winner's legal fees in all cases, without regard to whether
the loser's position was credible and without regard to whether the
winner is plaintiff or defendant. 16
Such a broad fee-shifting regime makes sense for several
reasons. First, it incentivizes litigants to advance positions they expect
to win and to settle cases based on their predictions for trial.17 If we
12. Note, supra note 2, at 1246-48 (explaining that two-way fee shifting should bring cases
to trial when each side is "rationally optimistic about its chances of prevailing" and stating that
"[t]hese are probably the cases.that should be tried").
13. The extent of the incentive may depend upon the ratio of costs to damages.
14. Clayton Act § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c), 37(b)(2)(C), (c)(1)(A), (c)(2), (d)(3).
16. See, e.g., Bungard, supra note 2, at 63-64 (arguing for a shift to the English Rule as a
means to increase the efficiency of the litigation process, incentivize potential tortfeasors and
potential victims to take optimal care ex ante, and encourage acceptance of personal
responsibility); Feuerstein, supra note 2, at 156-73 (proposing a system awarding reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party on a motion for summary judgment or dismissal in most state
cases); Rosen-Zvi, supra note 2, at 739 (suggesting a progressive fee-shifting rule awarding
attorney fees to low- and middle-income parties who prevail in civil litigation against "moneyed
litigants"); Note, supra note 2, at 1241-42 (recommending a fee-shifting system exacting attorney
fees from the losing party's attorney).
17. See Bungard, supra note 2, at 51-52 (concluding that the English Rule "promotes
efficiency by encouraging the optimal amount of care and discouraging the filing of suits with less
than a high probability of success"); see also Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shiftingand Incentives to Comply
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believe that adjudication accurately applies law to fact, then we would
like settlements to reflect as closely as possible what would occur at
trial. A broad two-way fee-shifting regime imposes the costs of further
litigation on the loser. In theory, this should incentivize parties to
pursue only those positions they expect to win.18
Second, English fee shifting works not only for a case as a whole
but also for interim decisions that are put to a court. For example,
prevailing parties can collect fees in pretrial skirmishes over procedural
or substantive issues. This interim fee shifting incentivizes parties to
avoid wasting litigant and judicial resources on motions that they are
likely to lose.19
Third, English fee shifting contains an offer-of-settlement rule
to address disputes regarding damages, as opposed to liability. This rule
shifts legal fees in the aftermath of a settlement offer or demand in
favor of the party who does better at trial than the last settlement offer
on the table. It thereby incentivizes litigants to make and accept fair
settlement offers (and demands) rather than to continue litigating. 20
Finally, fee shifting effectively distinguishes the costs of
litigation from the costs of the underlying conduct that triggers
litigation.21 Where a plaintiff is injured-whether by a contract breach
or a tort-the plaintiff cannot be made whole if its recovery does not
include the legal fees it must devote to obtaining a recovery. Fee shifting
in favor of prevailing plaintiffs appropriately internalizes legal fees as
a cost of the defendant's litigation-triggering conduct. Conversely,
where defendants prevail, the legal fees are not appropriately
with the Law, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1121 (1993) (modeling the differences between the American
and English rules of fee shifting and concluding that fee shifting "in favor of prevailing plaintiffs
enhances ... incentives to settle disputes").
18. Of course, the strength of this incentive will vary depending on the ratio of fees to the
amount in controversy. Where fees are large relative to the amount in controversy, fee shifting
provides a powerful disincentive to pursue positions that are likely to lose. Where fees are small
relative to damages, the incentive will be much weaker.

19.

Cf. Lindsey D. Blanchard, Rule 37(A)'s Loser-Pays "Mandate":More Bark than Bite, 42

U. MEM. L. REV. 109, 116-18 (2011) (quoting Mark S. Cady, CurbingLitigationAbuse and Misuse:
A JudicialApproach, 36 DRAKE L. REV. 483, 515 (1987)) (explaining that Rule 37's potential for
fee shifting on every motion to compel discovery will reduce "needless costs and delays").

20. Cf. Jay N. Varon, Promoting Settlements and Limiting Litigation Costs by Means of the
Offer of Judgment: Some Suggestions for Using and Revising Rule 68, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 813, 821
(1984) (explaining how an offer-of-settlement rule works to encourage efficient settlement in the
context of Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Albert Yoon & Tom Baker, Offer-of-

Judgment Rules and Civil Litigation:An Empirical Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in
the East, 59 VAND. L. REV. 155, 159 (2006) (finding a general offer-of-judgment rule reduced the
length of time suits took to reach resolution).
21. Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 28, 251-52 (1970) (explaining the
tertiary costs of accidents: the transaction costs associated with assigning responsibility for an
accident to the guilty party).
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internalized as a cost of the defendants' lawful behavior. Rather, they
are treated as a cost of the plaintiffs mistaken decision to litigate a
losing claim and are therefore logically imposed upon the plaintiff.
At first glance, fee shifting would appear to address the principal
concerns regarding litigation expense. Defendants should like fee
shifting because it discourages plaintiffs from pursuing weak or
meritless claims. Plaintiffs should like fee shifting because it provides
more complete compensation for meritorious claims and encourages
defendants to make early, fair settlement offers. Courts should like fee
shifting because it should incentivize the parties to resolve disputes
amicably based on their predictions of what courts will do, thus saving
courts from actually having to adjudicate cases.
But if fee shifting can solve some of litigation's core problems,
the cure in some circumstances may be worse than the disease. Most
important, the core problem facing plaintiffs with meritorious claims is
that imbalances in risk preferences and resources may lead them to
forego their claims or to settle for too little, particularly when
confronted with an aggressive defendant waging a war of attrition. By
increasing the stakes of litigation-so that a losing plaintiff is stuck not
only with its own legal fees but also with its opponent's-fee shifting
may render litigation just too expensive and risky for plaintiffs to bear.
While fee shifting certainly will incentivize wealthy, confident plaintiffs
to pursue the merits aggressively, it is likely to have the opposite effect
on cash-strapped or risk-averse plaintiffs. Fee shifting may be intended
to favor the stronger litigation position, but in a regime characterized
by imbalances, it may instead favor the stronger litigant, even if that
litigant has the weaker litigation position. 22
Moreover, even where parties are equally matched in resources,
fee shifting may not have its desired effect if the parties are uncertain
about the likely trial outcome. Given imperfect information,
information asymmetries, and inherent optimism, fee shifting can
sometimes lead both sides to spend more than they otherwise would in
the hope of receiving some of that money back following a victory. 23
These two problems, which I will label "litigant imbalances" and
"litigant uncertainty," are more pronounced in some cases than in
22.
See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1596 (1993) ("The disparity of resources between litigants
may result in one party outspending the other and, as a result, affecting the result of the
controversy.").
23. See SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 431 (comparing the situations where fee shifting can
decrease legal costs with those where fee shifting can increase legal costs); Hughes & Snyder,
supra note 5, at 231 (arguing that optimistic litigants will anticipate shifting their costs to their
rivals, thus shrinking the acceptable settlement range).
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others. In David-versus-Goliath disputes-cases that a small plaintiff
simply cannot afford to lose-litigant imbalances are likely to cause fee
shifting to have the opposite of its desired effect. In these cases, fee
shifting may reinforce our system's tendency to favor the stronger party
rather than the stronger position. Moreover, asymmetries between the
parties may aggravate the problem of litigant uncertainty, as
differently situated parties view the case through very different lenses
and cannot agree on a framework within which to settle. In contrast,
the problems of fee shifting are less intense in straightforward
commercial disputes between equally matched, sophisticated corporate
counterparties. If both litigants have ample resources to bear both their
own and their opponent's expenses, fee shifting will favor the stronger
litigation position, rather than the stronger party. Moreover, similarly
situated parties are less likely to embrace diametrically opposed
perspectives on the merits and are more likely to agree on a framework
for a commercially reasonable resolution.
Given that fee shifting's costs are more pronounced in some
circumstances than others, policymakers interested in fee shifting could
draw one of two conclusions. First, they could conclude that we should
only employ fee shifting in certain narrow circumstances where we can
reap its benefits without its costs. This targeted use of fee shifting is
largely the approach we have embraced in the United States. As noted
above, we use fee shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs in certain
subject areas to incentivize particular kinds of lawsuits. We also use
broader fee shifting through Rule 11 to disincentivize particularly
egregious conduct. But we have rejected a widespread fee-shifting
regime because of its potential pitfalls.
A second approach, which we have not adopted in this country
but which I suggest is worth considering, is to examine the
circumstances in which fee shifting works to see if we can replicate
those circumstances in other settings as well. If fee shifting works
where litigant imbalances are less pronounced, then perhaps we can
combine across-the-board fee shifting with other reforms designed to
level the playing field and assuage litigant imbalances. Indeed, Part III
will explore how the introduction of a third-party risk bearer into the
mix would offset the negative effects of litigant imbalances and might
even alleviate the problems associated with litigant uncertainty.
III. COMBINING FEE SHIFTING WITH MARKET MECHANISMS: THE U.K.
EXAMPLE

If the principal problem with fee shifting is its tendency to
aggravate, rather than alleviate, the manner in which litigant
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imbalances can skew litigation outcomes, then we should consider
market-driven reforms that have the potential to level the litigation
playing field. In the United Kingdom, the availability of "after the
event" ("ATE") litigation insurance offsets the negative side effects of a
broad fee-shifting regime. A party with a meritorious claim that is
nonetheless fearful of losing at trial can purchase insurance to cover its
opponents' legal fees in the event of a loss. Moreover, the leading ATE
providers in the United Kingdom are willing to accept contingent
premiums for their coverage. The claimant, in other words, can pay out
of a recovery from the defendant instead of paying up front. Indeed,
until April 2013, the ATE insurance premium was treated as a
recoverable cost, so that a losing defendant had to pay a prevailing
claimant's ATE insurance premium as part of its litigation costs.
ATE insurance offers benefits to both claimants and defendants.
Claimants able to purchase ATE insurance can proceed with
meritorious claims without fear of bearing their opponents' costs.
Moreover, where ATE insurance has been purchased, defendants know
that if they prevail, their costs will be reimbursed by the insurer,
without regard to whether the claimant has the financial wherewithal
to pay them. Given a deep-pocketed legal-fees insurer, then, both sides
have incentives to pursue meritorious positions knowing that their
costs will come back to them if they prevail.
One may worry that a claimant covered by ATE insurance will
become overconfident and overly aggressive, pursuing weak as well as
strong positions. There are two protections against this risk. First, for
the case as a whole, the insurer will engage in substantial due diligence
before deciding to provide coverage. As with any insurer, ATE insurers
will only provide coverage where they believe that the risk of loss is low.
Indeed, ATE insurers who charge contingent premiums have even
stronger incentives to insure only those cases they expect to win-for in
a losing case, the insurer will have to pay an insurance claim without
ever earning a premifim to offset even a portion of that loss. Second,
once a case is proceeding, the terms of an ATE policy may restrict
coverage if the claimant is overly aggressive. For example, a reasonable
settlement offer may count as a "win" under the terms of the ATE policy
and deprive the claimant of coverage if it unreasonably insists on
pursuing the case.
In the United Kingdom, cash-strapped or risk-averse plaintiffs
can combine ATE insurance with financing from lawyers or third
parties to pursue their claims. Effective April 2013, clients have the
choice of financing from third parties or financing from their lawyers in
the form of contingent fee arrangements (known as "damages based
agreements" or "DBAs") or conditional fee arrangements ("CFAs").
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These options are largely the result of the so-called Jackson reforms,
proposed by Lord Justice Jackson and adopted by parliament. 24
Historically, the only option available to clients in the United Kingdom
who needed litigation financing were CFAs, under which lawyers would
work for a discounted hourly fee in exchange for an equal uplift in the
event of success. Lawyers could discount fees by as much as one
hundred percent, effectively charging nothing upfront in exchange for
up to two hundred percent of their fees at the end. This arrangement
was particularly attractive to clients because prevailing claimants could
recover from the other side not only their lawyers' hourly fees but also
the uplift associated with a CFA. This allowed prevailing plaintiffs to
cover their lawyers' compensation and the ATE premium from a
separately calculated cost reimbursement paid by the defendant, which
would leave the client with almost all of the damages awarded. But by
restricting lawyers to CFAs-and an upside that could be no greater
than the downside lawyers would risk-the former regime did not
encourage top-flight hourly fee London lawyers to accept cases for
clients who could not pay traditional hourly fees. Top U.S. law firms
that bill by the hour generally will not consider taking a case on a
contingency unless they expect to make more than twice their hourly
fees in the event of success; indeed, they generally hope to triple (or
more) their hourly fees. Given that U.K. lawyers on a CFA could never
earn more than two hundred percent of their hourly fees, the most
profitable hourly fee law firms in London were reluctant ever to accept
a case on a CFA basis.
The Jackson reforms sought to expand client options, first by
embracing third party litigation funding as a tool to promote access to
justice and then, ultimately, by allowing DBAs as well. Where clients
sought to bring large, complex cases of the sort that demanded the
services of the top law firms, they could now obtain third-party funding
to cover the law firms' hourly fees. Moreover, as of April 2013, the
Jackson reforms permit law firms to enter into DBAs so that they earn
a percentage of the damages recovered rather than an uplift on their
24.

See RUPERT JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT 108 (2009),

available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/8EB9F3F3-9C4A-4139-8A93-56FO9672EB
6A/0/jacksonfinalreportl4OllO.pdf (stating Lord Justice Jackson's proposals regarding excessive
or disproportionate civil litigation costs in the English court system); see also Mark Shelton et al.,
Litigation Update: Reforms to Civil Justice Procedure-Implementation of Jackson Report,
LEXOLOGY (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g--f06a7081-79cf-46b09900-fde389b92509 (explaining the reforms and considering the changes made to the U.K.'s
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure equivalent, the Civil Procedure Rules). See generally Legal Aid,
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2010-12, PARLIAMENT OF THE U.K. OF GR. BRIT. &
N. IR., http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-12/legalaidsentencingandpunishmentofoffenders
.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2013) (describing the Act, pending its final publication).
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hourly rate. For large, promising cases, the best law firms may see
DBAs as a way to earn a great deal more than they can earn for hourly
work.
The only drawback to the Jackson reforms is that ATE
premiums and lawyer uplifts will not be reimbursable for cases filed
after April 2013. While defendants will have to pay prevailing plaintiffs
for the actual hours worked by their lawyers over and above the
damages awarded, defendants will not have to cover the cost of
purchasing ATE insurance or financing those fees (via CFAs, DBAs, or
third-party funding). If claimants decide to seek financing or insurance,
they ultimately will have to pay for it out of the damages they collect.
When one considers the way fee-shifting and market solutions
work together in the United Kingdom, one sees a regime designed to
promote merits-based dispute resolutions. Claimants with weak or
meritless claims hoping to extract a nuisance settlement will not want
to pursue their cases because doing so exposes them to liability for their
opponents' legal fees. Nor can claimants with weak claims shift the risk
of loss to a third party because ATE insurers will not cover weak cases
and lawyers and third-party funders will not finance those cases.
Indeed, because the United Kingdom imposes costs liability on losing
litigation funders as part of the two-way fee shift (so that prevailing
defendants can collect from the claimant or the funder), most U.K.
funders require claimants to line up ATE insurance as a prerequisite to
funding the case. 25 This means that there are two additional sets of eyes
critically evaluating a claim's merits. Many claimants, therefore,
cannot proceed unless a third-party funder and an ATE insurer both
agree that the claim is meritorious.
From a defendant's perspective, this regime is quite attractive.
The U.K. regime reduces the chances that defendants will face weak or
meritless claims in the first place: the system disincentivizes claimants
from bringing weak claims on their own and makes it unlikely that
insurance or financing will be available for weak claims. Moreover,
when a defendant is confronted with a weak claim, the defendant can
resist strongly, knowing that if it is successful on the merits, it will
recoup its defense costs from the claimant, its insurer, or its funder.
The U.K. regime is also attractive to claimants. Claimants with
strong claims now have the choice of financing those cases themselves
(if they have the resources and risk tolerance to do so) or looking to

25. See Grania Langdon-Down, Litigation Funding: An Overview of a Contentious Area of
Growth, LAw Soc'Y GAZErrE (May 21, 2009), http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/featureslitigationfunding-an-overview-of-a-contentious-area-of-growth (quoting a U.K. funder as saying, "You can
insure a case without funding, but you cannot fund a case without insurance").
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lawyers and third-party financiers and insurers. Claimants, lawyers,
third-party financiers, and insurers can all take into account that if the
claim prevails, the claimant can expect to recoup not only its damages
but also the costs of the case. The Jackson reforms have scaled back cost
shifting in a way that prevents a claimant from being made truly whole,
because it cannot recover the costs of having to finance or insure its
case. This dampens the salutary effects of the fee-shifting model. But
fee shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs in the United Kingdom still
makes it easier for funders and lawyers to finance cases there than in
the United States, because at least hourly fees will be added over and
above damages to the successful claimant's recovery. In the United
States, if the costs of litigation are too large relative to the damages at
stake, it simply will not be worth it for a client, lawyer, or third-party
financer to finance the claim. Prevailing claimants in the United
Kingdom at least recover their fees, which expands the pie to which
clients, lawyers, and third-party financers can look in the event of
success and makes it easier for claimants to pursue meritorious claims,
even if they are small relative to the costs of pursuing them.
Because ATE and litigation funding are widely available to
claimants in the United Kingdom, the problems that would plague fee
shifting in the United States are less pronounced. In the United States,
the core problem with fee shifting is its potential to deter meritorious
suits by risk-averse plaintiffs who simply cannot chance losing the case
and bearing their opponents' legal fees; in other words, fee shifting may
tend to aggravate litigant imbalances. In the United Kingdom, by
contrast, risk-averse plaintiffs with meritorious claims can purchase
ATE insurance to pursue their claims. In this manner, market
mechanisms offset the litigant imbalances that would otherwise plague
a fee-shifting regime, enabling the U.K. system to reap the benefits of
fee shifting without its principal drawback.
Indeed, not only do market mechanisms reinforce the
effectiveness of fee shifting in the United Kingdom, but the converse is
true as well. As noted, fee shifting increases the chances that a plaintiff
can find a lawyer or third party willing to finance its claim, even if the
claim is small relative to the size of the merits. In the United States, a
contingent-fee lawyer or litigation funder will not fund a meritorious
claim unless the damages are large enough to cover the costs of
litigation and to compensate for bearing the risk and costs of financing
the suit, while still leaving enough to compensate the plaintiff for its
injury. In the United Kingdom, the expected recovery will include not
only the compensatory damages but also the costs of pursuing the case,
which increases the chances that a lawyer will take it on a contingency
or a funder will provide the requisite financing. The Jackson reforms
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undermine this salutary feature of the U.K. system by confining fee
shifting to actual hours spent and no longer shifting the cost of ATE
insurance or lawyer uplifts. The United Kingdom, however, still
provides prevailing plaintiffs with more complete compensation than
the United States and thereby facilitates investment by lawyers and
financers in small, meritorious claims.
The United Kingdom's policies favoring litigation funding and
ATE insurance are designed to combat the problem of litigant
imbalances, but they also may assuage the problem of litigant
uncertainty. Recall that fee shifting may be costly because it will
incentivize optimistic litigants in close cases to spend more in the hope
of recouping those additional costs. While ATE insurance and litigation
funding cannot eliminate this problem, they can help to assuage it by
introducing a neutral third party into the mix. A third-party financer
or insurer offers an experienced, critical eye with which to evaluate
litigation at the outset. Claimants who feel wronged may overestimate
their chances of prevailing in court. Lawyers may bring a more critical
eye than clients-especially when they are contemplating a CFA or
DBA. But given a lawyer's general inclination to support his client's
perspective and to sympathize with his client's plight, even a lawyer
concerned about losing money may be unduly optimistic about its
prospects for success. This will be especially true if the lawyer is not
fully occupied with hourly fee work, and if the opportunity cost to the
lawyer is not nearly as great as his or her stated hourly rate. In
contrast, a third party litigation funder or insurer brings no biases or
sympathies to its evaluation of a case. It must place dollars, not
opportunity cost, at risk.
This is not to say that market mechanisms entirely offset the
inefficiencies that may arise from a fee-shifting regime. An optimistic
party in a close case may spend more where it has offloaded the cost
and risk of that expenditure to third parties. But the introduction of
neutral third-party evaluators should offset this risk somewhat.
IV. ADAPTING MARKET MECHANISMS AND FEE SHIFTING FOR THE U.S.
MARKET

Although fee-shifting rules and market mechanisms work well
together in the United Kingdom, one cannot simply embrace the
wholesale import of the U.K. model without considering differences
between the two legal systems and cultures. I suggest there are at least
four differences that we must consider in evaluating whether the U.K.
system could work in the United States.

2013]

FEE SHIFTING AND FREE MARKET

1825

First, the U.S. litigation system is more expensive than the U.K.
system, for reasons that have nothing to do with fee shifting or market
mechanisms. Pretrial discovery and motion practice in the United
States tend to be more elaborate and expensive than in the United
Kingdom. 26 The U.S. system is geared toward unturning every stone
during the pretrial process and deposing every potential witness so that
the litigants are prepared for trial before a jury. The system also
includes a summary judgment procedure that is intended to save the
cost of a trial but that in most cases ends up imposing additional costs.
In the United Kingdom, by contrast, pretrial witness statements are
substituted for depositions, motion practice is less extensive, and there
are no jury trials. Thus, to the extent that fee shifting incentivizes
parties to spend more money in close cases, this cost may be more
pronounced in the United States than in the United Kingdom.
I suggested at the outset that our goal should be to incentivize
parties to pursue meritorious positions and to forego meritless ones,
and that litigation in pursuit of the merits is a social good. But for those
who think our system already is too expensive, my proposals may
simply not be worth the extra cost in close cases. Even if fee shifting
tends to discourage weak positions and improve accuracy by rewarding
winners and punishing losers, one may believe the improved accuracy
is just too expensive. For someone principally concerned with expense,
the attractiveness of a regime that combines fee shifting with market
mechanisms would depend upon the answers to two empirical
questions: (1) how does the extra spending in close cases under this
regime compare to the saved costs in cases that are not close, and (2)
how much does the introduction of neutral third parties offset the
tendency of a fee-shifting regime otherwise to incentivize additional
spending?
A second difference between the U.S. and U.K. cultures is the
very different value placed upon litigation as a driver of beneficial social
change. Whether the issue is civil rights, consumer protection, or
workplace safety, to name a few, litigation has been an engine of social
progress in the United States. Consistent with that commitment to
progressive litigation, Rule 11 does not penalize litigation positions that
make nonfrivolous arguments for the extension of existing law, even if
26. See NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKAROS, INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, WHERE THE MONEY
GOES: UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 103-15
(2012), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND
MGl208.pdf (showing in tabular form the costs of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in the United States). Compare FED. R. CIV. P., with MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CIVIL
PROCEDURE RULES (2013) (Britain's Civil Procedure Rules) (showing a complexity to the pretrial
discovery and motion system in the United States not found in the United Kingdom).
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those positions ultimately fail. In contrast, a U.K.-style fee-shifting
regime would punish losing positions even if those positions were
brought with a view toward effecting legal change-and no for-profit
litigation finance company or ATE insurer would be willing to back a
claim that is likely to lose. The U.K. approach would therefore make it
much more difficult for plaintiffs to use litigation as an agent of social
change. This may be a cost of fee shifting we are unwilling to accept. 27
It is not by accident that we have thus far rejected broad two-way fee
shifting in the United States and that where we have embraced fee
shifting, we have done so in favor of prevailing plaintiffs to promote
particular categories of litigation that are socially beneficial. A two-way
fee-shifting regime would undermine the policy choices embedded in
our system and make it more costly (and in some cases impossible) to
use litigation to effect social change.
A third related, though distinct, difference between the U.S. and
U.K. legal regimes is the availability of class actions in the United
States. In the United Kingdom, when lawyers pursue group actions,
they must sign up the clients individually. This means that when it
comes time to seek financing and ATE insurance, there is a client with
whom the third-party risk bearer can do the deal. If the group is large
enough, individual members will authorize their shared lawyer to
negotiate the ATE policy and financing contracts. But the lawyer will
expressly do so on behalf of the clients and will have the power to bind
those clients. In the United States, by contrast, lawyers initiate class
actions before a class has been certified and before they have authority
to bind their purported clients. Although class representatives and class
counsel exercise some powers on behalf of a purported class before it is
certified, they generally cannot bind class members. The class action
mechanism presents a challenge to implementing a broad fee-shifting
regime in the United States: if the class is not certified, or ultimately
loses on the merits, to whom is the defendant supposed to look for its
fees? Class actions also pose a problem for market mechanisms like
ATE insurance and third-party litigation finance: who, after all, has the
power to bind the class at the outset by committing to pay a financier
or insurer a portion of the ultimate recovery? A litigation funder will
naturally be reluctant to finance a lawsuit before a class has been
27. Feuerstein, supranote 2, at 152 & n.193 (stating that some authors believe two-way fee
shifting can chill novel legal theories and listing these authors' works); cf. Carl Tobias, Rule 11
and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 506 (1989) (explaining that fee shifting in the
Rule 11 context can result in the chilling of novel claims, particularly in civil rights cases). On the
other hand, see Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-PartyLitigation Funding, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1312-18 (2011), where Professor Steinitz has argued that it may be in thirdparty funders' interests to pursue rule changes.
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certified and class counsel has been approved, for there is nobody
available to guarantee that the funder will be repaid in the event that
the case succeeds. If courts were willing to supervise the process, class
representatives and class counsel could, in theory, line up courtapproved insurance and funding deals. Provided that insurance was
available, courts could implement two-way fee shifting in class
actions-a move that defendants almost certainly would welcome. But
courts might be reluctant to devote resources to questions of fee
shifting, insurance, and financing before deciding whether a class can
even be certified.
A fourth important distinction lies in the differing historical
evolution of the bar and of financing mechanisms in the United
Kingdom versus in the United States. In the United Kingdom, fee
shifting has existed for centuries,28 and litigation finance and ATE
insurance have been around for a number of years. 29 For the United
Kingdom to expand plaintiffs' and lawyers' options by introducing
contingent fee arrangements (DBAs) in April 2013 seemed like a
relatively small development, particularly given that U.K. lawyers
could already work for a conditional fee. By contrast, in the United
States, contingent fee arrangements are embedded in the culture and
have come to dominate particular aspects of the legal system (e.g.,
personal injury cases and class action litigation). The plaintiffs' bar
would view the imposition of a new fee-shifting regime as yet an
additional, unwelcome obstacle to the institution of a lawsuit. Whereas
today, a contingent fee law firm need only decide whether it is willing
to bear the expense and risk associated with taking a case, if fee shifting
were implemented the firm would also have to line up ATE insurance
to cover that risk. While U.K. lawyers are accustomed to this practice,
it would be a new, additional burden for U.S. plaintiffs' lawyers. This is
not to say that fee shifting's lack of popularity among plaintiffs' lawyers
would doom it to failure. Some plaintiffs' lawyers would see the virtue
of fee shifting for strong claims, and provided that ATE insurance was
readily available and easy to line up, they might not view it as too
burdensome. Moreover, if an embrace of fee shifting were accompanied
by an embrace of insurance and financing mechanisms that expanded
the financial options for lawyers and clients-as the Jackson reforms in
the United Kingdom have done-some members of the plaintiffs' bar
would view this positively. And iegardless, the defense bar would likely
28. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25 (discussing 'The U.K. Example").
29. Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal and Economic Approach to Third-Party
Litigation Funding, 19 CARDOZO J. INT'L & Comp. L. 343, 396-99 (2011) (tracing the history of
third-party litigation funding in the United Kingdom).
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welcome a fee-shifting regime, so a tepid response from plaintiffs'
lawyers might be accompanied by strong enough support from business
groups to make implementation of the regime feasible.
Given the differences between the two legal systems and
cultures, the challenge for reformers is to consider what kinds of
adjustments could be made to U.K. fee shifting to facilitate its
importation into the United States. One potential solution would be to
retain the U.S. approach of using fee shifting only in specified contexts
but to expand those contexts to additional areas where insurance and
financing solutions would be available to offset fee shifting's ills. This
incremental approach to reform might, for example, impose fee shifting
in conventional commercial disputes, even if they involve unequal
adversaries, because we would at the same time enable risk-averse or
cash-strapped parties to obtain insurance and financing to level the
playing field. But we might refuse to apply fee shifting to social-impact
litigation, where we fear that fee shifting would interfere with the
progressive, salutary effects that litigation can otherwise have on our
society (and we might follow Jackson's recent move to abolish two-way
fee shifting in small, personal injury cases). Likewise, we could impose
two-way fee shifting and facilitate financing and ATE insurance in class
action litigation after class certification but refrain from imposing this
regime before that point. Such limitations on fee shifting would also go
a long way toward winning over a plaintiffs' bar that would vehemently
oppose fee shifting if they saw it as an obstacle to initiating meritorious
class actions.
Dealing with the extra costs associated with American discovery
poses a more difficult problem, primarily because the most promising
solution is one that would impose additional burdens on judges. Recall
that if fee shifting succeeds in incentivizing litigants to pursue
meritorious positions and to drop meritless ones, it also can have the
adverse effect of increasing expenses in close cases where the problem
of litigant uncertainty is at its worst. The solution would be to impose
fee shifting based on the strength of the winning and losing positions
rather than simply based on whether they win or lose. Fee shifting
might go beyond Rule 11's effort to deter meritless positions by
imposing rewards for strong claims and punishments for weak (but not
meritless) claims. But to avoid incentivizing parties to overspend in
close cases, the regime might refuse to shift fees where cases are close
and either party could easily have won. In this manner, we would
bolster incentives to pursue strong positions and forego weak ones
without altering incentives with respect to positions in between.
But to require judges to review fee-shifting motions with yet
another nuanced standard-somewhere between the automatic U.K.
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rule and the U.S. Rule 11 approach-would impose additional burdens
on an already overburdened judiciary. The burden might not be
inordinate. After all, judges would only have to decide whether to shift
fees in cases that are actually adjudicated, which is small in comparison
to the number of cases settled. But there is no doubt that the more we
stray from the straight loser-pays English standard, the more
complicated implementing any reform would become.
It is beyond this Article's scope to manage all the differences
between the U.K. and U.S. systems and come up with a definitive
proposal for importing U.K. fee-shifting rules and market mechanisms
for adaptation in the United States. If, however, we want to solve one
of litigation's principal ills-and incentivize parties to pursue or drop
positions based on their merits-the effort is likely to be worth it.
V. CONCLUSION

The best way to accommodate the competing interests of U.S.
defendants, plaintiffs, and courts may lie in a combination of feeshifting rules and market mechanisms similar to those found in the
United Kingdom. If we implement more widespread fee shifting and use
market mechanisms to ensure that it favors the stronger position rather
than the stronger party, we could go a long way toward improving the
accuracy of litigation resolutions in this country.

